In 2022 and beyond, U.S. intelligence reportedly discovered that China had used components, software or know‑how linked to the G42 AI firm (based in the United Arab Emirates) to enhance its long‑range air‑to‑air missiles — specifically the PL‑15 and PL‑17 — improving their range, targeting, flight performance and perhaps seeker software. These upgrades could give China’s air force a sharper edge, especially over Taiwan or in a confrontation with the U.S. The link to the UAE complicates Washington’s strategic relationship with Abu Dhabi, a longtime U.S. partner.
Here’s what we know — and don’t yet know — plus the broader strategic fallout.

What the Allegations Say
- The core claim: G42, which has ties to the UAE government and commercial partnerships with major global tech firms, had an arrangement with China via Huawei. Together, they allegedly shared software linked to missile‑flight optimisation and targeting for the PL‑15 and PL‑17 missiles.
- These are among China’s most advanced air‑to‑air missiles. Upgrades may include longer range, better electronic counter‑counter‑measures (ECCM), improved seekers, and refined flight paths.
- The upgrade reportedly occurred despite U.S. export controls and concern about Chinese military advancement. The U.S. views this as China closing the capability gap with American and allied aircraft‑missile systems.
- G42 denied wrongdoing, stating its work with Huawei was strictly commercial and that it ceased that relationship in 2023. The UAE has also moved to remove Huawei equipment from some of its data centers under U.S. pressure.
What Was Missed or Underreported
Covered:
- The outline of the alleged tech transfer from UAE to China via G42/Huawei.
- The strategic implications for U.S.–China military competition.
- Pressure on the U.S. to manage its relationship with the UAE.
Less covered but important:
- Technical details: The nature of the transferred technology remains unclear.
- Chain of custody: How the transfer occurred—via software, personnel, or other means—has not been made public.
- Network scope: This may not be a one-off incident; similar patterns might exist elsewhere.
- Regional balancing: The UAE continues to juggle its U.S. alliance with deeper economic ties to China and Russia.
- Regulatory response: Future legal or economic actions are still unknown.
- Operational impact: It’s unclear how much of a real-world advantage China gained from the upgrade.
- Industrial implications: Involvement in missile upgrades likely touches several areas of the Chinese defense tech supply chain.
- UAE’s risk: Beyond U.S. backlash, there’s a potential for international reputational damage.
Why This Allegation Matters
1. Military Capability Shift
Upgrades to Chinese air-to-air missiles mean potential changes to aerial superiority in the Indo-Pacific, especially around Taiwan or U.S. Navy carrier groups.
2. Technology Transfer Challenges
Dual-use tech—civilian and military—makes export control more difficult. AI software and algorithmic targeting systems are especially hard to track.
3. Shifting Alliances
The UAE is walking a fine line: it wants to maintain security ties with the U.S. while pursuing economic and technological collaboration with China.
4. Strategic Supply Chains
China’s missile industrialization is accelerating, and global firms—intentionally or not—are contributing to it. Tech partnerships may now serve military ends.
5. Diplomatic Fallout
For the UAE, the allegations could sour U.S. relations and expose it to economic or military sanctions. For the U.S., it calls into question the reliability of its partners in preventing sensitive tech transfers.
What Could Happen Next
- Possible sanctions or export controls on UAE firms, including G42.
- Rewriting or tightening of U.S.–UAE trade and tech agreements.
- Acceleration of China’s domestic missile development efforts.
- Increased U.S. scrutiny on the Gulf region as a battleground in the tech race with China.
- Greater restrictions on cloud services, AI tools, and digital infrastructure shared with foreign governments.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Q1. What are the PL‑15 and PL‑17 missiles?
They are advanced Chinese long‑range air‑to‑air missiles. The PL‑15 reportedly has a range exceeding 200 km, while the PL‑17 may be designed for even longer-range engagements, possibly targeting support aircraft like AWACS.
Q2. How did UAE technology end up in Chinese missile systems?
The allegation is that software, algorithms, or digital systems developed or facilitated by UAE-based G42 reached China via commercial arrangements with Huawei, which may have transferred that tech into military systems.
Q3. Did the UAE knowingly support Chinese military development?
G42 and UAE authorities deny any intentional military cooperation with China. However, intelligence suggests the tech transfer still occurred, raising questions about oversight and control.
Q4. Why is this a problem for the U.S.?
China’s enhanced missile capabilities reduce the U.S.’s technological advantage in the Indo-Pacific and highlight vulnerabilities in export control regimes designed to protect sensitive tech.
Q5. Will there be consequences for the UAE?
Possibly. Sanctions or diplomatic repercussions may follow if the U.S. concludes the transfer violated agreements or endangered its national security interests.
Q6. Is international law being violated?
International arms control laws mainly target physical weapons and missile systems. Software, AI, and digital components fall into legal gray zones, making enforcement difficult.
Q7. Could this accelerate China’s military modernization?
Yes. Access to advanced software and algorithms from international partners—intentional or not—can shorten R&D cycles and improve capabilities.
Q8. What lessons should allies take from this?
Allies must better control and audit dual-use technologies, especially in AI, cloud infrastructure, and software engineering.
Q9. Is this an isolated incident?
Probably not. The use of international tech partnerships to gain military advantage is increasingly common, and other cases may emerge.
Q10. What should we expect next?
Tighter export controls, increased geopolitical tension between the U.S., China, and Gulf states, and more aggressive regulation of AI and defense-related software.
Final Thought
This case reflects a new age of defense dynamics—where national security isn’t just about tanks and missiles but also about data, software, and AI. It highlights the complexity of global tech partnerships and the challenges democratic nations face in protecting military advantage without stifling innovation or diplomacy.

Sources Financial Times


